Although virtues and vices are typically thought of as individual qualities, a growing body of philosophical inquiry suggests that they can comprise collective qualities as well. In this paper, I expand upon the work of philosopher Miranda Fricker to question whether arts organizations can be considered institutionally virtuous and/or vicious. I begin with a discussion of collective epistemology, as offered by Margaret Gilbert, which lays the foundation for how collectives can function as "plural subjects" in pursuit of a common belief or goal. From here, I offer a brief overview of virtue/vice epistemology, which I then connect to Fricker's model of "collective," and by extension, "institutional virtue." Throughout, I provide illustrations of arts organizations who might themselves be said to possess institutional virtue and/or vice. I conclude by elaborating on the accountability of individuals working on behalf of, and sometimes in opposition to, the inner ethos of arts organizations--particularly when those organizations might fall into the harmful realm of institutional vice.